魏尚进：数字人民币将会如何改变中国？

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魏尚进（《复旦金融评论》主编、复旦大学泛海国际金融学院学术访问教授、哥伦比亚大学终身讲席教授）

  当多国中央银行还在着手探究发行数字货币可能性的时候，中国已经从去年开始推出一系列数字货币的试点项目。数字人民币（本文用我生造的词eRMB替代官方比较拗口的DC / EP）本身并不一定能助力人民币挑战美元的全球主导地位。其真正的意义在于有潜力改变中国的科技巨头与传统多数国有银行之间的博弈与较量，这或许会间接提高这些银行的国际竞争力。
  数字人民币的试点项目采用具有“可控匿名机制”的两层结构。中国人民银行（央行）以数字形式发行货币并让获得授权的一组大型国有银行和其他选定的金融机构实行运营，包括向家庭和企业兑换。与仍处在讨论阶段的一些其他央行的数字货币不同，中国的家庭和企业不会在央行直接拥有eRMB账户，中国人民银行也可以由此减免掉一些运营中可能出现的干扰。
  授权机构只能看到一部分个人或企业的数字足迹（例如，当他们使用eRMB存取资金时）但无法获取更多信息也不能让信息保留的时间超过所需。这就是“可控匿名”的“匿名”部分。而“可控”部分，是指中国人民银行可以查看给定eRMB单位的整个流通历史，并可以选择是否使用或共享相关信息。两层系统和可控匿名机制可以成为任何最终形成的数字货币国家项目的核心特征。
  在试点阶段，eRMB以免费数字红包的形式随机分发给了个人。在全面启动阶段，政府可以使用多种途径来鼓励其广泛使用。例如，eRMB可以用来支付政府和国有企业雇员的工资（约占劳动力的15％）和公共部门养老金。政府采购项目、向低收入家庭的转移支付，并且对企业的补贴也可以采用这种新型的货币形式。此外，政府还可以要求纳税人以eRMB形式缴纳部分所得税和其他公共部门费用，并逐步提高规定的比例。
  数字人民币会有多重要？通过取代纸币和硬币，eRMB将为中国人民银行节省印刷和流通实物货币的成本以及定期替换纸币与硬币的成本，节约的金额额目前达到每年几十亿元人民币。尽管这些节省是好事，但其金额相对于中国政府的预算或GDP而言不是很大。
  eRMB也不会完全杜绝地下经济中的非法交易，因为犯罪分子肯定会使用美元或欧元、金链或有价值的艺术品等替代手段来结算交易。（超过一半的实体美钞，特别是100美元面值的钞票，都在美国境外流通，通常起到帮助其他国家地下经济运作的作用。）
  我认为尚未公开讨论过的eRMB的一个更重要的意义，是它有可能改变中国的银行与大型科技公司之间的博弈与较量。
  蚂蚁集团、京东和百度等数字企业集团的崛起为中国家庭和企业创造了巨大价值。比如当今的中国家庭可以通过数字金融平台获得各种各样的共同基金产品，其便利程度甚至连美国人都尚无享有；而数百万以前无法获得银行贷款的小微企业家则无需抵押就可获得企业发展的资金。
  有能力提供此类贷款反映了大型科技公司的优势，它们不仅可以观察一家小微企业在线业务的收入增长，还可以观察到许多“软信息”，例如客户对公司产品和服务的评论以及产品退货率。这样的数据（银行通常是无法获得的）使大型科技公司可以生成较高质量的信用评分。大数据还使大型科技公司能够在处理信贷申请、分配贷款和收取还款方面，比银行更便宜、更快捷。
  许多国家的监管机构最近开始越来越担心大型科技公司会滥用这些优势。在资金管理和贷款等金融服务领域里市场份额一直在输给数字巨头的传统银行，或许正在为针对数字公司采取了更强硬立场的监管机构暗中喝彩。
  在eRMB的可控匿名机制下，中国人民银行将获得与数字巨头公司类似的能力，来获取与追踪各类银行原本看不到的信息。尽管中国人民银行仍将缺乏例如客户评论等其他信息，但其收集的收入与支出增长的数据在某些方面将优于大型科技公司的数据，因为它将包括一个企业在整个经济体中的交易历史。这使中国人民银行原则上也能够估算潜在借款人的信用状况，并以低成本或零成本的方式与各类银行共享由此产生的新的信用评分，从而使这些银行也能够向以前缺乏相关信息、无法触及的企业发放无抵押贷款。这可能会降低甚至消除大型科技公司（相对于商业银行）的信息优势。
  虽然eRMB在如何帮助人民币提升国际化程度方面也有许多期望，我判断数字人民币最终在国际上的使用程度，与现在的人民币形式一样，将取决于几个因素。随着中国在全球贸易和金融领域的重要性不断提高，将有更多的交易以人民币结算。中国国有企业可以坚持以人民币结算部分国际交易，而中国人民银行也可以签署更多使用eRMB的互换协议。而中国资本管制的强度以及可供国际投资者买卖的人民币计价的流动性资产的数量将限制数字人民币国际化的程度。反之，同样的逻辑表明这些领域的进一步改革与开放则可以促进eRMB在国际金融与贸易中的采用。
  美国政策也是影响人民币国际化的一个因素。例如，美国政府可以引导或阻止美国金融机构使用人民币。但是，美国经常通过利用美元的全球特权地位实施的各种跨境金融制裁，可能会促进包括人民币在内的美元替代品更早出现。
  总而言之，eRMB本身不一定推动人民币国际化的进一步提高。它的主要影响可能是改变中国国内银行与大型科技公司之间的相对力量与博弈。
  How Will the Digital Renminbi Change China?
  SHANG-JIN WEI
  Editor-in-chief of Fudan Financial Review
  Professor of Finance and Ecnomics of Columbia University
  Former Chief Economist of Asian Development Bank
  NEW YORK – While many central banks are still investigating the possibility of issuing a digital currency, China has rolled out a digital currency via a series of pilot programs since last year. The eRMB – my term as opposed to the more awkward official DC/EP- by itself will not help the renminbi to challenge the US dollar’s global dominance. Its true significance instead lies in its potential to alter the balance between China’s technology giants and traditional majority state-owned banks, thus indirectly enhancing the banks’ international competitiveness.
  The pilot programs employ a two-tier structure with “controlled anonymity.” The People’s Bank of China (PBOC, the central bank) issues eRMB and lets an authorized group of large state-owned banks and other selected financial institutions to operate and face households and firms – the digital currency’s ultimate users. Unlike with some other central-bank digital currencies under discussion, Chinese households and companies would not have an eRMB account directly at the central bank, thus distancing the PBOC from any operational glitches that might occur.
  The authorized institutions see only a portion of the digital footprints of individuals or firms – for example, when they deposit or withdraw funds using eRMB – and are not supposed to keep the information longer than needed. That’s the “anonymity” part of “controlled anonymity.” The “controlled” part, however, is that the PBOC sees the entire history of the movement of a given eRMB unit, and can choose whether or not to use or share the information. Both the two-tier system and controlled anonymity are likely to be central features of any eventual national program.
  In the pilot schemes, eRMB were distributed to randomly chosen individuals via free digital gifts. At the full-scale launch, the government will have several tools at its disposal to encourage wider use. For example, it could pay the salaries of government and state-owned firms’ employees – some 15% of the workforce – and public-sector pensions in eRMB. Government procurement programs, transfers to low-income households, and subsidies to firms also can be carried out in the new currency form. In addition, the government could require the taxpayers to pay a progressively higher proportion of income taxes and other public-sector fees in eRMB.
  How significant will the digital renminbi be? By replacing China’s physical notes and coins, the eRMB will save the PBOC the costs of printing and circulating new currency and regularly replacing a portion of existing notes, which currently amount to billions of renminbi a year. While these savings are socially useful, they are unlikely to be large relative to China’s government budget or GDP.
  Nor will the eRMB completely stamp out illegal transactions in China’s underground economy, because criminals will doubtlessly settle deals using alternative means such as dollar or euro bills, gold chains, or valuable artwork. (More than half of all physical US dollar bills, especially $100 dollar bills, circulate outside the United States [1] , often aiding the underground economy in other countries.)
  A far more significant consequence of the eRMB that has not been publicly discussed is its potential to alter the balance of power between China’s banks and Big Tech firms.
  The rise of digital conglomerates such as Ant Group, JD.com, and Baidu has created significant value for Chinese households and firms. Households can access a large array of mutual-fund products through digital financial supermarkets with a level of convenience unavailable even to Americans, while millions of small entrepreneurs unable to obtain bank loans previously can now secure funding that is important for their business growth without having to post a collateral.
  The ability to make such loans reflects Big Tech’s advantage in observing not only the revenue growth of an online business, but also “soft information” such as customer reviews of the firm’s products and services, and product return rates. Such data – which typically is not available to banks – allows Big Tech to generate high-quality credit scores. Big data also enable Big Tech firms to process credit applications, distribute loans, and collect repayment much more cheaply and quickly than banks.
  Regulators within and outside China have become increasingly worried that Big Tech firms could abuse these advantages. Traditional banks, which have been losing market share to the digital giants in both money management and lending, are probably cheering the regulators on as they take a tougher stance.
  Under controlled anonymity for the eRMB, the PBOC will gain a similar ability to monitor what is otherwise invisible to banks. Although the PBOC would still lack other information such as customer reviews, its data on growth of revenues and expenses would in some ways be better than Big Tech’s, because it would include an economy-wide history of transactions. This may allow the PBOC to estimate potential borrowers’ creditworthiness and to share these new credit scores with banks at low or no cost, enabling them to make uncollateralized loans too to firms for which they used to lack relevant information, which could reduce or even eliminate Big Tech’s information advantage.
  The eventual international use of the eRMB will depend on a number of factors. As China’s global trade and financial importance grows, more transactions will be settled in renminbi. Chinese state-owned firms could insist on settling a portion of their international transactions in renminbi, while the PBOC could sign more swap agreements involving the currency. But Chinese capital controls, as well as the relatively small amount of liquid renminbi-denominated assets that can be bought and sold by international investors, will limit the currency’s international uptake. By the same logic, continued reforms and openness in these areas can promote its greater adoption.
  US policy also will play a role. The US authorities could, for example, discourage American financial institutions from using the renminbi. Ironically, frequent US financial sanctions that exploit the dollar’s privileged global position could promote the emergence of alternatives to the greenback, including the renminbi.
  The eRMB on its own will not advance the renminbi’s internationalization. Its main impact is likely to be a rebalancing of power between the banks and the Big Techs at home.